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A significant public policy trend is the increased use of alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR) procedures, such as mediation and arbitration, in a variety of settings.  Mediation is the 
most utilized, yet least analyzed, of these procedures.  This article proposes a general equilibrium 
framework to analyze mediation.  Mediators function as Walrasian auctioneers by altering trade-
off among bargaining issues, thereby facilitating voluntary settlements (i.e., general equilibrium).  
The results include:  1) successful mediation leads to Pareto efficient settlements; 2) non-neutral 
mediators—those with a stake in the outcome—can manipulate outcomes by adding resources to 
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1.  Introduction 
  
Mediation is one of the world’s oldest forms of alternative dispute resolution (ADR).  
The procedure uses a neutral third-party to help resolve disputes, but mediators generally do not 
have binding decision-making authority.  As such, mediators are successful when facilitating 
voluntary settlements.  This contrasts with arbitration, an ADR procedure that forces a binding 
settlement onto the disputants.  Mediation is utilized across the globe both formally and 
informally.  Formal mediation helps resolve disputes in a large variety of settings that include 
labor-management negotiations, international relations, legal disputes, community disputes, and 
school conflicts, among others (see Wall et al., 2001, for a review).  Informal mediation, though 
its prevalence is difficult to quantify, occurs whenever individuals attempt to resolve others’ 
conflicts:  parents helping children voluntarily resolve a disagreement over toys, a pastor 
counseling disputing church members, or an individual attempting to prevent a fist-fight among 
strangers.  Given mediation’s prevalence across such a broad spectrum of activities, it is clear 
that it has a significant impact on society in terms of reducing dispute costs.     
In the U.S., formal mediation plays a prominent and expanding policy role in labor 
contract disputes, court-mandated pre-trial mediation, and community disputes, among others.  
The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Services, established in 1947 under the Taft-Hartley 
Act, mediates over 6000 labor disputes annually in the U.S. (case numbers assigned approach 
20,000 annually).  The National Association for Community Mediation reports that the number 
of community mediation programs in the U.S. has surged in the past decade from about 150 to 
over 500, and these programs are now estimated to mediate over 45,000 cases annually.
1  The 
stakes of mediation efforts range from relatively small (e.g., grievance mediation of employment 
disputes) to enormous (e.g., U.S. mediation efforts between Israel and Palestine).
2     2
Given the history, prevalence, and increased use of mediation in distinct policy arenas 
(i.e., labor-contracts, tort reform, community mediation), it is somewhat surprising that economic 
research has done little to analyze the process and outcomes of mediation.  This is likely due to 
the prevailing notion that mediation is an “art” form and, since successful mediators 
“orchestrate” settlements, the process itself is not well suited for systematic analysis.  This 
purpose of this article is to highlight a framework for analyzing mediation:  the general 
equilibrium framework.  In other words, I argue that economic analysis can advance our 
understanding and analysis of mediation by viewing negotiations as an exchange economy and 
mediators as the Walrasian auctioneers of exchange theory.  Our simplest understanding of 
general equilibrium utilizes the Edgeworth Box and describes the Walrasian auctioneer who calls 
out prices to generate general equilibrium.  Negotiators who bargain over the allocation of two or 
more issues can be viewed as participants in an exchange economy, and a “Walrasian” mediator 
facilitates settlement by altering the negotiators’ terms-of-trade over bargaining issues.  This is a 
simple yet powerful insight into mediation:  the basic task of the mediator is to vary the relative 
price among issues on the bargaining table to induce voluntary agreement among negotiators. 
The Walrasian auctioneer approach to mediation is outlined in this article, and several 
results are highlighted.  Though mediation is often considered a form of art not well suited to 
rigorous analysis, the Walrasian mediator generates several results.  First, mediators facilitate 
voluntary settlements by varying the perceived terms-of-trade or trade-off rate (i.e., the relative 
price) among bargaining issues, and this requires minimal knowledge of negotiator preferences.  
Secondly, a non-neutral mediator can manipulate outcomes by introducing outside resources into 
mediation.  Finally, mediated outcomes will generally Pareto dominate arbitrated outcomes.      3
This article is not meant to underrate the importance of intangible people-skills required 
for successful mediation.  Rather, I hope to highlight a useful framework for analyzing mediation 
more rigorously than in the existing literature.  While many mediators may enjoy using a variety 
of techniques to gather information on negotiator preferences, a key insight of this article is that 
successful mediation can be accomplished with incomplete (in fact, minimal) information on 
negotiator preferences—they must simply alter relative prices of bargaining issues in response to 
excess demand.
3  The use of a general equilibrium approach for analyzing dispute resolution will 
hopefully open a door to a more systematic analysis of mediation.  Finally, this article will also 
highlight the efficiency advantage of mediation over arbitration, which may help justify the 
accolades mediation often receives over arbitration and other forms of dispute resolution. 
2.  Negotiations and Dispute as an Exchange Economy 
  Assume the case of bilateral negotiations between two bargainers, a and b, over two 
issues, x1 and x2.
4  This is the simplest case that allows for “trade-offs” between issues, although 
the analysis extends easily to the n-issue case (as well as the m-bargainer case).  Assume well-
behaved preferences such that Uj
’(xi)>0 and Uj
’’(xi)<0  for j=a, b, i=1, 2.  In general, assume 
incomplete information regarding negotiator preferences, although it will be useful to also 
assume that there is common knowledge of standard assumptions like continuity and strong 
monotonicity (as well completeness, transitivity, and reflexivity).  Of course, complete 
information in bargaining can generate efficient outcomes without any 3
rd-party intervention 
(e.g., see Rubinstein, 1982), and so incomplete information is important to motivate the 
usefulness of a Walrasian mediator.  Now consider an Edgeworth “Bargaining” Box.  Assume an 
initial endowment, E, that exhausts the total supply of both items,  1 X  and  2 X .  The initial 
endowment may be the result of a previous round of contract negotiations in repeated bargaining   4
or long-term relationships.  Examples of two issues a labor-management dispute might be profits 
(or excess profits) and job security, and management would then have preferences that are 
increasing in both the amount of its profits retained and in workforce flexibility (e.g., the 
opposite of job security for workers).
5  The dimensions of the Edgeworth Box may be 
determined by physical limitations (e.g., profits), legislated limitations (e.g., work hours 
limitations), or also by a previous stage of negotiations. 
  A common characteristic of negotiations is making trade-offs, x1 for x2, which implies a 
relative price or terms-of-trade among the bargaining issues.  Figure 1 shows the Edgeworth Box 
diagram under the assumption of an initial endowment, E, and a terms-of-trade line CD.  The 
contract curve of Pareto efficient allocations is OAOB.  These terms-of-trade, or trade-off rate, 
lead to package demands xA= ) , ( 2 1
a a x x  and xB= ) , ( 2 1
b b x x  (and utility levels U0
A and U0
B) for 
negotiators A and B, respectively.  This implies excess demand for bargaining issue #1, thus 
highlighting a key point:  any dispute can be defined as a state of excess demand for at least one 
bargaining issue.   
  At this point, general equilibrium theory introduces the mythical Walrasian auctioneer 
who calls out prices and adjusts them appropriately to generate equilibrium in the economy—the 
adjustment in Figure 1 is to terms-of-trade line FG.  This price adjustment role is precisely what 
the mediator can do to help resolve a bargaining dispute.  Mediators facilitate a process of 
“tâtonnement” (curiously but typically translated as “groping”) described in the classic work of 
Walras (1926), whereby proposed trade-offs between negotiated items go back and forth until 
there is equilibrium in the system of equations of negotiated items.  Though Walrasian 
tâtonnement typically assumes a large number of market participants, this assumption is not   5
necessary (assuming preferences are convex).  All that is required is that the mediator observe 
revealed demand xA  and xB, and hence the excess demand for one or both bargaining issues. 
  Two concerns of using the general equilibrium framework are worth noting at this point.  
First, why would bargaining demands necessarily satisfy budget balance?  This question actually 
highlights an important initial task of the mediator: to gain the trust of the bargainers.  In other 
words, a necessary condition of this analysis is that the negotiators trust the mediator and submit 
to the constrained optimization decision implicit in this framework.  This is more likely to be the 
case when negotiators voluntarily submit to mediation compared to involuntary (e.g., by court 
mandate) mediation.
6  Secondly, it may not seem natural that negotiators respond to every 
mediator proposal with a package demand.  A mediator might propose only a settlement outcome 
(i.e., a point within the bargaining box), and negotiators either accept or reject the proposal but 
otherwise provide no further information on demand.  The point to make here is that the 
Walrasian mediator framework gives insight as to what will likely improve the success rate and 
efficiency of mediation:  eliciting negotiator demands to gather the information required to 
appropriately alter the trade-off rate.  I therefore continue with the assumption that mediators 
will function as Walrasian auctioneers.  They need not have full information on negotiator 
preferences, but they are at least assumed to observe excess demand at each iteration of trade-off 
proposals. 
In the Walrasian mediator framework, the key tool is the ability to change the terms-of-
trade among x1 and x2.  In other words, trade-offs are necessary in order to resolve a dispute.  For 
example, because Figure 1 shows a case of excess demand for issue 1 (e.g. profits, which is 
usually evidenced by a firm’s wage offer<union’s wage demand), the Walrasian mediator must 
“increase” the price of issue 1 relative to issue 2 to resolve the dispute.  This is shown with the   6
dashed trade-off line FG and the resulting negotiators’ common settlement choice at S*.  This 
seems simple, but it may not be clear how mediators would alter trade-offs or price ratios in a 
bargaining context.  To alter the trade-off rate, the mediator might provide the negotiators with 
new information pertinent to the dispute, or the mediator might amplify the benefits and/or 
minimize the opportunity cost of issue #2, while doing the opposite for issue #1 (more on this in 
Section 3).  As long as the mediator can increase the relative price of any bargaining issue in 
dispute (or the issues most in dispute), excess demand can be eliminated and the dispute would 
be resolved.   
An alternative view is that mediation sessions are meant to learn information about the 
preferences of the negotiators (see also Raiffa, 1982).  For example, a mediator may attempt to 
learn the share parameter, α, of a negotiator’s Cobb-Douglas preferences:   α α − = 1
2 1 x Ax Ui .  Once 
preferences of both negotiators have been “learned”, the mediator can then suggest Pareto 
improving settlements, and even identify Pareto efficient outcomes, rather than bother with 
suggesting trade-offs.
7  Even if preferences were known with certainty, proposing a Pareto 
efficient settlement produces the same outcome as proposing the trade-off rate that would lead 
negotiators to optimize at the Pareto efficient settlement (i.e., the price ratio could be identified if 
preferences were known with certainty).  Therefore, proposing settlements does not dominate 
proposing trade-off rates when there is full information on preferences.  And when preference 
information is incomplete, we noted before that acquiring information on issue demands is 
important.  This information may be easiest to gather if mediators propose trade-offs and then 
elicit negotiator demands at trade-off proposals.  Further, proposing settlements is not done by all 
mediators and so suggesting trade-offs is perhaps more like real-world mediation (see Wall et al., 
2001; Holley, Jennings, and Wolters, 2001).  Given the iterative nature of mediation, at least   7
some degree of preference-learning is more likely in mediation than, say, arbitration.  
Arbitrators, therefore, are less likely to know the boundaries of the contract zone in negotiations, 
and this incomplete information is an important determinant of one of the Section 4 results.  
I note in the next section that much of the evidence on the practice of mediation is 
consistent with Walrasian mediation—whether or not mediators describe their activities as 
such—and so this framework can be as useful to understanding mediation and its outcomes as 
consumer theory is to understanding individual choice.  Finally, it is clear that the Walrasian 
mediator approach to resolving disputes requires less information about negotiator preferences 
than alternative approaches.  This is advantageous considering that it is costly to gather such 
information.  The Walrasian mediator framework is still a simplification of the mediator’s job, 
but the point is that many mediation tactics can be aimed at the basic objective of altering the 
negotiators’ terms-of-trade to achieve “agreement” equilibrium.
8 
This analytical framework can generate some general hypotheses about mediation.  For 
example, we noted before that lack of trust in the mediator makes it less likely the negotiators 
will submit to the constrained optimization problem of the Walrasian mediator framework.  
Therefore, one would hypothesize that settlement success is inversely related to trust in the 
mediator.  Evidence in support of this hypothesis is found in Wissler (1995), who finds that 
success rates increase in the commitment and receptivity of the negotiators to mediation.  The 
present framework would also generate the hypotheses of lower success rates for more serious 
disputes (i.e., larger excess demand or negotiators who are less willing to accept the mediator’s 
terms-of-trade suggestions), as well as lower success rates for single-issue disputes, which do not 
allow for trade-offs.  There is support for both of these in the empirical literature in Depner et al.   8
(1995) and Whiting (1994), respectively.  Wall et al. (2001) also notes that mediated settlement 
rates are higher in elementary school student disputes than in difficult international disputes.   
This general equilibrium framework also highlights another key aspect of the mediator’s 
job:  identifying the issue(s) for which there is excess supply.  With positive prices and well-
behaved preferences there can not be excess demand for all bargaining issues.  In other words, 
mediators must identify the issue(s) for which there is excess supply in order to successfully 
mediate.  This is consistent with the practice of identifying creative trade-offs in mediation.   
In the event that negotiators also dispute the initial endowment, then the mediator must 
first align beliefs of what the starting point is before moving forward in mediation.
9  In complex 
international negotiations a “single-negotiations text” (SNT)—an initial proposal by third party 
interveners—is often used as a starting point for negotiations (see Raiffa, 1982, for a more 
thorough description and extended examples).  Such a SNT is not meant to be a serious 
contender for final settlement, but through the negotiators’ criticism of the SNT, mediators can 
either gain useful information about negotiator preferences or, more simply, the Walrasian 
mediator can gain information on revealed excess demand for certain issues.  Trade-offs can then 
be suggested in successive attempts to align supply and demand into general equilibrium.   
3.  Supporting Evidence on Mediator Tactics 
  Before highlighting the results that follow from this framework, I examine whether or not 
evidence supports the notion that mediators attempt to alter the trade-off rate of bargaining 
issues.  That is, do mediators behave in a manner consistent with Walrasian mediation?  In a 
recent survey of the mediation literature Wall et al. (2001) notes a large variety of tactics used by 
mediators.  Among those of interest for this paper:  information provision, pressure tactics, 
threats, and even monetary compensation.  Some of these tactics are culturally specific, and   9
Western cultural does not usually empower mediators to use pressure tactics (Wall and Stark, 
1998).  This implies that the encouragement of concessions, creative packaging of trade-offs, or 
information provision are relatively more important tactics for U.S. and Western mediators.  
However, it is noteworthy that Eastern mediators make frequent use of threats as they are 
empowered by their society to do so (Abu-Nimer, 1996).  Furthermore, there is evidence that 
some Eastern mediators literally compensate one or both negotiators either from their own 
resources or from community funds (Murray, 1997; Wall and Callister, 1999), which highlights a 
fairly explicit way to alter the relative price of bargaining issues.  Greig (2001) also notes the 
importance of using outside resources for mediation success in international dispute resolution.
  The mediation literature identifies three different styles of mediation, of which one is of 
particular interest.  The “manipulator” style of mediation can vary the perceived appeal of any 
suggestion by adding to or subtracting from proposals (see Wilkenfeld et al., 2003, and citations 
therein).  Additionally, these manipulative mediators make use of side payments, a tactic that 
makes them especially effective.  This contrasts with the more passive style of the “facilitator” 
mediator, though each may be particularly effective in certain situations.  Wilkenfeld et al. 
(2003) notes that in crisis mediation and other high tension settings, the manipulative style may 
be most effective because bargainers are more receptive to mediator pressures.
10  In public sector 
mediation, Briggs and Koys (1990) conclude that active and tenacious mediators—those who 
actively package issues, use pressure tactics, and make suggestions—are more successful than 
passive mediators.  The manipulator or active mediator is most readily seen as a Walrasian 
mediator, though altering trade-off rates is not limited to only the assertive mediators.   
  A specific noteworthy example of mediation are the U.S. mediation efforts in the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.  The U.S. has mediated the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians for   10
years, and the two key issues can be identified as security and land.  The U.S. has been 
somewhat of a manipulator mediator by contributing much of its own resources to “sweeten the 
deal” in hopes of producing an agreement.  As noted before, one could view the addition of such 
outside resources as part of the mediation efforts to alter the terms-of-trade between security and 
land.  With excess demand for land in the current conflict, the provision of arms and weapons to 
Israel effectively and explicitly lowers the price of security relative to land in Israel’s 
negotiations with the Palestinians.  This implies a relative increase in the price of land, which 
can be viewed as a Walrasian mediator technique to bring the two sides closer to agreement.
11  
Of course, the likelihood of success in these particular mediation efforts depends, at least in part, 
on the Israeli and/or Palestinian willingness to trust the mediators fully and accept new trade-off 
rates over the bargaining issues.  
  The previous example of U.S. mediation efforts in the Middle East highlights an 
important point:  In many international disputes, mediation is not conducted by a disinterested 
outsider, but rather by individuals with a stake in the outcome.  This is most notable in large-
scale international mediation.  When stake-holders inject resources into mediation efforts, this 
can be analyzed as an attempt to alter the trade-off rate of bargaining issues.  However, an 
alternative view is that the addition of resources is a mediator tactic to expand the dimensions of 
the Bargaining box, especially when certain bargaining issues can be easily augmented with 
monetary compensation.  In this way, the mediator can alter the location of the contract curve in 
the Bargaining box.
12  By expanding the dimensions of the Bargaining box, in addition to 
altering trade-off rates through other mediator tools, mediators can manipulate outcomes. 
Consider the example of the mediation efforts in Figures 2a and 2b.
13  Assume the 
mediator has a certain desired outcome, M, that cannot currently be supported as a Pareto   11
improving settlement (Figure 2a).  The mediator may choose to add resources to the negotiations 
and give additional resources to one or both negotiators.  Figure 2b shows the addition of Qs 
units of issue x1, some to each negotiator.  This both expands the x1 dimension of the bargaining 
box and moves the endowment point to E’.  Note in the Figure 2b example, the additional Qs 
units of issue x1 are divided among both negotiators.  The key point is to add sufficient x1 or x2 
such that the new contract curve, which will shift due to the new Bargaining box dimensions, 
passes through the desired allocation M.  The additional Qs amount of x1 is divided among the 
negotiators so that M can be supported as a Pareto efficient outcome along the appropriate terms-
of trade line CD (Figure 2b).  Of course, the contract curve is unobservable to the mediator and 
so it cannot be known when enough resources have been added to place M on the new contract 
curve.  The mediator may choose to add resources in several stages, thus allowing the mediator 
to iterate towards his desired outcome until M at least falls within the Pareto improvement lens.  
Even the second-best outcome of a Pareto improving, but not a Pareto efficient, settlement might 
be considered some level of success.  However, a second-best outcome does not exhaust all 
possible gain from negotiations, and so it may plant the seeds for future dispute.  
While not a general result, at least for certain classes of preferences it can be proven that 
any allocation with the Bargaining box can be supported as an efficient equilibrium with the 
appropriate addition of x1or x2 (see Results section).  An addition of resources also has the 
potential to significantly complicate the analysis because negotiators may come to expect an 
infusion of resources.  If this is the case, then the mediator becomes part of tri-lateral 
negotiations with the bargainers, which is beyond the scope of this article.  In our initial analysis, 
however, this view that mediators may attempt to manipulate settlements by giving resources to 
one or both bargainers is consistent with the reality of international mediation where major   12
power mediators can and do bring sizeable resources into mediations efforts.  In fact, such 
additional resources are often seen as key to successful mediation (Greig, 2001; Wilkenfeld et al, 
2003).  These stakeholders who sweeten the deal with outside resources are attempting to partly 
facilitate a settlement, and partly facilitate a settlement acceptable to the mediator.  As can be 
seen in the particular example of U.S. mediation in the Middle East, the addition of resources by 
no means guarantees successful mediation.  It was earlier noted that the negotiators’ trust and 
acceptance of the mediator will always be a key ingredient towards settlement, whether or not 
additional resources are added.  Nevertheless, there is evidence on the practice of mediation that 
is consistent with the hypothesis that mediators may desire to manipulate outcomes in this way.  
It is clear that mediators employ many different tactics that can be used to effectively 
change trade-off rates in negotiations, and other tactics actually alter the dimensions of the 
bargaining box and the location of the contract curve.  This is most apparent when a mediator 
monetarily compensates one or both negotiators.  Information gathering/provision, though not as 
blunt of a tool, can also be used to highlight aspects of certain trade-offs that effectively alter the 
terms-of-trade.  The more complicated the negotiations, the more difficult it may be to alter the 
negotiators’ terms-of-trade, but the fact is that many of the tools used by practicing mediators are 
consistent with hypotheses derived from the general equilibrium framework. 
4.  RESULTS  
We earlier noted some testable hypotheses that are generated by the Walrasian mediator 
framework.  We now highlight three theoretical results of interest.  Two results have already 
been indicated, but their generality is discussed below.   
 
RESULT 1:  Successful mediation produces a Pareto efficient agreement.   13
Proof:  Assume N issues, such that xi=( )
i
N
i i x x x ,...... , 2 1  is the demand vector for negotiator 
i, with i=A,B,....,M  negotiators.  Then let x=[xA,xB,….xM] be the vector of 
demanded bundles of M negotiators over N issues.  If the relative price vector 
over bargaining issues is p, then if (x,p) is a (Walrasian) mediated settlement, this 
implies that x is Pareto efficient by the first welfare theorem.  That is, in our 
framework a mediated settlement is equivalent to a Walrasian equilibrium:  the 
settlement is feasible, and each negotiator is optimizing with his budget set of 
bargaining issues.   
 
Therefore, for a given initial endowment or allocation of issues (and well-behaved 
preferences, etc.), there is precisely one relative price that will promote general equilibrium, and 
this equilibrium will be on the contract curve of Pareto efficient outcomes.  Implicit assumptions 
to produce this result are that negotiators are “price takers” in the sense that they trust the 
mediator and take mediation suggestions as given.  Noncompetitive behavior would imply that 
bargaining power would be an important part of any settlement.
14  This general result does not 
depend on the mediator having complete information on the negotiators’ preferences.  Mediators 
must simply alter trade-off rates in response to revealed excess demand for bargaining items and, 
if negotiators optimize based on these trade-off rates, mediated settlements are efficient.
15 
 
RESULT 2:  Mediators can produce specific settlements when outside resources are added. 
  Certain additional assumptions on preferences are required for this result, and so it is not 
as general as Result 1.  I prove the case of where negotiators have Cobb-Douglas preferences, 
although I have yet to find the minimum assumptions necessary for this result.   
 
Proof:  Consider two negotiators, A and B, with standard Cobb-Douglas preferences over 
two issues, x1 and x2:  α α − = 1
2 1 a x a Ax A U  and  β β − = 1
2 1 b x b Bx B U .  The contract curve 
equation (MRSa=MRSb) can be written as 
) ( 1 ) 1 ( 1
2 1 ) 1 (







a x   .  Or,   14
solving for  2 X  as a function of  1 X  we obtain:  1
1
2 2
























α β .  
By the continuity property of these preferences, the contract curve is continuous, 
and so the expression  2 X =f(x1a , x2a , 1 X )  in (1) is also a continuous (linear) 
function mapping  1 X  to  2 X  for a given M=(x1a,x2a).  Thus, for any desired 
allocation M=(x1a,x2a) there exists infinite pairs ( 1 X , 2 X ) that satisfy the contract 
curve equation (1) for M.  Most importantly, there exists a pair ( 1 X , 2 X ) 
satisfying M=(x1a,x2a) such that either  W X X + = 1 1
ˆ  (with  2 2
ˆ X X = ) or 
Y X X + = 2 2
ˆ (with  1 1
ˆ X X = ), where W,Y>0 are resource additions and  ) ˆ , ˆ ( 2 1 X X  
is the initial dimensions of the bargaining box.   
 
In other words, the ability to add resources to  1 X  or  2 X  is sufficient for any desired 
allocation to be sustained as a Walrasian settlement for this class of preferences.
16  One can see 
in Figure 2 that when the desired allocation M lies above (north-west) of the contract curve, the 
mediator will need to add resources to issue x2, whereas x1 must be augmented if M lies below 
(south-west) of the contract curve.  The more distinct are the preferences of the negotiations (i.e., 
the difference in α and β), the more resources may need to be added if the desired allocation is 
far from the initial contract curve.  This indicates that such mediations where negotiator 
preferences are quite different may be more difficult to manipulate with the addition of outside 
resources.   
This second result is quite interesting in that it suggests that mediators might exploit the 
fact that they may prefer some outcomes over others. 
 Of course, a mediator is ideally a neutral 
third-party to negotiations.  But, as noted before, certain mediation efforts that involve a 
mediator with a stake in the outcome are seen as necessary, especially in international mediation.  
Whether guided by self-interest, or by notions of distribute justice, fairness, etc., a mediator who 
can alter the dimensions of the bargaining box can also exercise some discretion over negotiated 
outcomes.  This may make it more difficult to achieve the first-best Pareto efficient settlement if   15
the mediator pushes for a specific outcome, because a non-neutral mediator is presumably more 
interested in achieving the desired settlement than in exhausting all possible gains from trade.  
Result 2, which stems from viewing negotiations as an exchange economy, is consistent with 
behavior in international mediation where stakeholders mediate while often adding their own 
resources to manipulate settlement outcomes.   
A third result involves comparing mediation and arbitration (or litigation).  The primary 
distinction between resolving disputes with arbitration versus mediation is that arbitrators dictate 
a binding settlement, whereas mediates do not typically have authority to impose a settlement.  
An arbitrated settlement of a dispute can be viewed as the imposition of any particular point 
within the Edgeworth Box.  One item immediately stands out:  Assuming incomplete 
information of negotiator preferences, an arbitrated settlement will not be Pareto efficient, in 
general, nor will there be an ex ante expectation of efficient arbitrated outcomes from the 
negotiators’ viewpoint.  Arbitrated settlements may often appear to be a compromise or “split the 
difference” between the negotiators’ final positions (e.g., see analysis in Farber, 1981), but such 
a compromise does not imply Pareto efficiency.  Consider the following version of arbitration 
that is commonly used in practice:  conventional arbitration. 
 Conventional  arbitration  (CA)  allows the arbitrator to impose a binding settlement, which 
implies imposing a point within the Edgeworth box.  Consider first the ex ante expected 
efficiency from the viewpoint of the negotiators.  Certain points are more likely than others to be 
chosen by an arbitrator, but empirical evidence supports the theoretical convention of modeling 
the negotiators’ uncertainty surrounding arbitrator settlement preferences as a distribution 
function.  In other words, the particular arbitration award for the current dispute is viewed as a 
draw from a random number distribution (see Ashenfelter, 1987; Ashenfelter and Bloom, 1984).    16
This is not to imply that arbitrators make random settlements, but rather that from the 
negotiators’ perspective there is a random component in likely arbitration awards.  It is this 
outcome uncertainty that is hypothesized to promote settlements among risk averse negotiators 
(see Stevens, 1966).  Successful arbitration, in some sense, can therefore be defined as the lack 
of its use.  It is the case that the presence of arbitration or mediation can hopefully promote 
voluntary settlement prior to use of either procedure.  In fact, it is the expectation of a Pareto 
worsening outcome from arbitration that would promote settlement prior to invoking arbitration. 
Consider that negotiator beliefs about arbitrator settlements are modeled as a bi-variate 
distribution over x1 and x2 that reflects their uncertainty over the likely arbitrated settlement of 
(x1,x2).  One could then explicitly calculate the probability of the ex ante expectation of a Pareto 
inefficient arbitrated settlement from the negotiators’ perspective.  Specifically, let  ) ˆ , ˆ ( 2 1
i i x x be the 
endowment level of issues 1 and 2 for disputants i=1, 2,  ) , ( 2 1 X X is the total availability of each 




i X x x = +  for i=1, 2.  Define A to be 
the set of all points  ) , ( 2 1




a x x U x x U ≥ .  Similarly, define B to be the set of 
all points ) , ( 2 1




b x x U x x U ≥ .  The set P= B A∩ formally defines the Pareto 
improving region, which is a subset of R
2-space—the shaded area in Figure 3.  The negotiators’ 
expected probability of arbitration producing a Pareto improving settlement, where arbitrated 
settlements are drawn from the distribution f(x1,x2), is given by ∫∫
P
dA x x f ) , ( 2 1 .  So, given initial 
endowments, the expected probability of a Pareto worsening settlement is 1 - ∫∫
P
dA x x f ) , ( 2 1 .  If 
we define successful mediation and arbitration as producing a voluntary settlement, then 
voluntary agreement under either mediation or arbitration obviously implies a Pareto 
improvement.  Failed mediation, however, implies preserving initial endowments (i.e., the status   17
quo), which is weakly part of the Pareto set.
17  So, it is when arbitration is invoked that there 
exists an expectation of a settlement that makes at least one negotiator worse-off, such as 
settlement Z in Figure 3.   
Of course, actual arbitrator decisions may be much more concentrated about the Pareto 
region than are expected settlements.  If, however, we assume incomplete information on 
negotiator preferences, then this implies that there exists a positive probably of an arbitrator 
issuing a Pareto worsening settlement—the result holds that an arbitrated settlement will, on 
average, be Pareto-dominated by mediated voluntary settlements.  This yields: 
 
RESULT 3:  Mediated outcomes will Pareto dominate arbitrated outcomes, on average.  
Negotiators will also ex ante expect mediation to Pareto dominate arbitration. 
 
 
Proof:  Let εa, εb >0 represent the error with which the arbitrator knows the negotiators’ 
preferences—a function of the incompleteness of arbitrator information on 
preferences.  Pareto efficiency implies equal marginal utility ratios over the 
bargaining issues.  It follows that the locus of Pareto efficient allocations (x1,x2) 
will only be known within some error term εPE=εPE(εa, εb).  Thus, there will exist 
with positive probability the selection of a Pareto inefficient allocation.  That is, 
the expected Pareto set PEexpected=PE+εPE.  Note that even an arbitrator who 
restricts settlement choices to the set of allocations considered being Pareto 
efficient—a well-intentioned arbitrator—will still choose with some error.  Result 
1 established that mediated outcomes are Pareto Efficient. 
  
The result that mediation is ex ante expected to Pareto dominate arbitration is 
already established.  Given the voluntary nature of mediation, the probability of a 
Pareto inefficient mediated outcome is expected to be zero, and the expected 
probability of a Pareto inefficient arbitrated settlement is greater than zero and 
given by 1-∫∫
P
dA x x f ) , ( 2 1 . 
 
This result assumes zero monetary cost of the dispute resolution procedure, and so 
differences in costs are important in comparing mediation and arbitration.  Also, since mediation 
is a more iterative process, time costs are important in comparing procedures.  Finally, empirical   18
settlement rates may help us accurately represent the trade-offs of mediation versus arbitration.  
Voluntary settlement rates are often considered a key criterion by which mediation success is 
measured, and the earlier analysis indicates some potential causes of mediation failure in the 
Walrasian framework.  Comparing mediation and arbitration and settlement rates is confounded 
by variety of factors in naturally occurring data.  For example, one must take into account the 
differences in available schemes for mediation due to legislative constraints.  Also, a comparison 
of settlement rates of mediation versus arbitration from field data is complicated by the fact that 
disputes not successfully mediated might only then proceed to arbitration.  In other words, the 
average arbitrated dispute is likely more difficult than the average mediated dispute.   
The aforementioned concerns notwithstanding, Sulzner (2003) examines a grievance 
mediation experiment in the Canadian public sector and finds evidence that mediation is 
successful in settling relatively serious grievances.  His study finds that 85% of grievances that 
were referred to arbitration were settled by use of an earlier-stage mediation.  Since these 
mediated cases were all initially referred to arbitration (adjudication), it seems to indicate that 
mediation can be quite successful even for the more difficult grievances usually headed for 
arbitration.  Other field statistics are reported in Hebdon (1996), where he finds success rates in 
contract mediation in the U.S. public sector as being anywhere from 26% (New York, 1983) to 
98% (New Jersey, 1999).  Brett et al. (1996) find success rates of mediation from 76%-79% 
across a wider variety of cases such as tort, environmental, contract, and construction disputes.  
This compares with conventional arbitration success rates (i.e., settlement rates prior to issuance 
of an arbitrated award) of anywhere from 65% to 82% when examining numerous studies’ 
settlement rate data from the U.S. and Canadian public sector (see Hebdon, 1996, and references   19
therein).   From the data, it is not clear that settlement rates are necessarily higher in mediation 
versus arbitration, thus highlighting the importance of outcome efficiency. 
One must also consider time and money costs in assessing mediation and arbitration 
desirability.  Brett et al. (1996) report average costs of arbitration as about 4 times higher than 
mediation.  Their data examines over 400 cases handled by major U.S. providers of arbitration 
and mediation services.  In addition to mediation’s lower money costs, Brett et al. find that 
lawyer preparation and participation time was more than twice as large in arbitration as 
mediation (and hourly/daily rates for comparable arbitrators and mediators are roughly the 
same).  Small stakes mediation and arbitration may not include any legal representation, but 
these data on lawyer time and monetary costs of arbitration versus mediation are quite indicative 
of the prevailing perceptions about these two procedures.  Mediation is cheaper and quicker than 
arbitration.  This seems to add to the evidence and analysis herein that show mediation outcomes 
are preferred to arbitrated outcomes, on average (or, that outcomes in the event of failed 
mediation are not as distasteful as certain arbitrated settlements). 
Overall, mediation seems to enjoy advantages over arbitration on several dimensions.  
Given the differences in institutional constraints in the field, as well as the sample selection 
problem in comparing the mediated versus arbitrated disputes, it is still difficult to draw 
conclusions for comparable disputes.  If mediation is more likely than arbitration to generate a 
voluntary settlement for a given dispute, then this would be still another advantage of 
mediation.
18  Nevertheless, for those cases in which neither arbitration nor mediation generate a 
voluntary settlement, there is a clear trade-off:  arbitration at least guarantees a (forced) 
settlement, but only with a positive probability that it is unacceptable to one or both bargainers.
19  
5.  Discussion   20
The preceding analysis of mediation considers a simplified framework that may be 
criticized as lacking the flavor of real world negotiations and/or mediation.  This criticism, 
however, would equally apply to general equilibrium theory as a whole.  There is a powerful 
message to convey in noting that the complexities of mediation can be simplified to a basic task 
of altering terms-of-trade to promote general equilibrium.  This is the job of the Walrasian 
auctioneer as economists know it.  Nevertheless, certain assumptions that have been implicit to 
this point are worth noting, because they are suggestive of where this work can be extended. 
First, we do not assume that negotiators gain utility directly from mediation, but evidence 
suggests that negotiators sometimes gain satisfaction from the process itself (Depner et al., 
1994).  Similarly, mediation itself might generate a positive externality.  For example, Kitzmann 
and Emery (1994) argue that children are shielded from hostile conflict in custody mediation, 
and gang mediation has been observed to provide middle-school students with safer schools 
(Tabish and Orell, 1996).  If positive externalities are generated to those external to the 
mediation itself (e.g., the entire community benefits from lower crime rates or domestic dispute 
incidents due to community mediation programs), then mediation will be relatively underutilized 
compared to what would be socially efficient.  An additional benefit to bargainers of utilizing 
mediation or any ADR procedure is that neutral third-parties can be used as scapegoats so that 
one or both bargainers may “save face”.  The ability to blame outcomes on mediators can be 
valuable and necessary in negotiations because it helps lower the cost of commitment and the 
cost of voluntary settlement, which makes settlement more likely. 
Many simplifying assumptions have been introduced for the purpose of initially 
examining general equilibrium theory’s potential contribution towards understanding and 
analyzing mediation.  I believe that such simplifications are useful and necessary in order to   21
illuminate the process of mediation for what it is:  an exercise in facilitating general equilibrium.  
This exercise may be in a formal (i.e., labor-management negotiations) or informal (sibling 
dispute) setting, and so it has general applicability.  While the Walrasian auctioneer is assumed 
to effortlessly know excess supply and demand in an exchange system, the mediator must 
employ a set of skills to gain the trust necessary to engage the negotiators in the mediation and to 
assess the state of the negotiators’ demands at different points in the mediation.  The mediator’s 
job is to then alter trade-off rates over a potential multitude of issues to eliminate excess demand 
and bring about a voluntary equilibrium settlement.  The parallel of this with the tâtonnement 
process of exchange theory is evident.  Once mediation is cast in the light of an exchange 
economy, economic analysis can bring much more to bear on this widely-used, but under-
analyzed, ADR procedure.   22
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1 These data are available from FMCS at http:///www.fmcs.gov and from the NAFCM website, 
http://www.nafcm.org, respectively. 
2 Consider also that judges often employ mediation skills in an unofficial capacity outside the courtroom in 
promoting settlement prior to trial (see Raiffa, 1982).    
3 The ability to highlight a basic approach to successful mediation is also important because a growing number of 
community-based mediation programs utilize community volunteers who, though trained to some extent, may 
respond better to a simple description of how to accomplish their objectives. 
4 This section draws upon insights in Raiffa (1982). 
5 You will notice that we assume some unique initial endowment, though it might be contested that bargainers each 
perceive a distinct endowment.  The issue is merely semantic, and we consider this no different than the case where 
individuals really just demand an excess amount of a particular good relative to what is available. 
6 The data in Brett et al. (1996) offer some support of this hypothesis.  He reports slightly higher settlement rates for 
voluntary versus involuntary mediations—79% versus 76%.  However, the difference is not statistically significant, 
indicating that the present analysis would apply equally well to either type of mediation. 
7 Note that under such a practice, a simple rejection of the proposed settlement by both negotiators does not inform 
the mediator as to whether one or both bargaining issues are in excess demand.  Secondly, acceptance by both 
negotiators will imply a Pareto improvement outcome, but not necessarily a Pareto efficient outcome. 
8 One might argue that negotiators may each perceive a different trade-off rate among issues.  Negotiators may each 
desire different price ratios, but it would often be unclear whether negotiators perceive different price ratios, or 
whether these perceptions are merely reflecting differences in preferences among negotiators.  In any event, the 
analysis still applies since the mediator’s task is still to alter unacceptable terms-of-trade to bring about equilibrium. 
9 This would obviously be the appropriate order of the two objectives since establishing the “correct” price ratio 
without first unifying the initial endowment will just imply that each individual demands a distinct point on the 
Pareto set (i.e., continued dispute). 
10 The third mediator-type is the “formulator”, which lies somewhere between the two extremes.  See Wilkenfeld et 
al (2003). 
11 Raiffa (1982) gives the example of the Camp David negotiations between Israel and Egypt where a SNT was used 
along with U.S. mediation pressure and sweeteners for achieving agreements. 
12 This is analogous to an increase in a factor of production as discussed in Rybczynski (1955). 
13 One might consider this as an example of the U.S.’s attempted mediation between Israel and the Palestinians.  Let 
negotiators A and B be Israel and the Palestinians, respectively.  Then let issues x1 and x2 be security and land, 
respectively.  The addition of security resources to Israel is the result of the U.S. contributing arms and money to 
Israel.  
14 Nickles and Hedgespeth (1991) find that mediator techniques are more effective when bargaining power is 
relatively equal among negotiators. 
15 Joyce (1998) studies the Walrasian tâtonnement process in a laboratory setting and finds that subjects under-
reveal demand in an attempt to manipulate price in tâtonnement auctions.  Nevertheless, it is noted that symmetric 
under-revelation would not affect the equilibrium trading price.  Even though this study is not directly analogous to 
bilateral negotiations, the potential implications on strategic or tactical asymmetry of the negotiators is quite 
intriguing. 
16 If one allows subtraction of resources, then the result holds trivially with no additional preference assumptions.  
To see this, note that resources could be added and/or subtracted until the total available supply of each bargaining 
issue is equal to the mediator’s desired settlement—thus, this gives all of both issues to only one negotiator.  
17 This assumes no costly delay in negotiations.  However, if time costs are considered the data (to be discussed 
shortly) indicate that mediation is still a quicker process than arbitration. 
18 Recall that when we speak of arbitration generating a voluntary settlement, I am referring to the ability of 
arbitration to produce a settlement prior to the use of the procedure (see Stevens, 1966). 
19 Another type of arbitration, known as final-offer arbitration (FOA) constrains the arbitrator to choose one of the 
bargainer’s final package offers.  A less constrained version of FOA utilized by some state jurisdictions allows the 
FOA arbitrator to final-offer select among individual bargaining issues.  Neither of these types of FOA rules alters 
the main result with respect to CA outcomes.  A binding outcome that makes one or both bargainers worse off will 
still occur with positive probability under FOA. 